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Observers of African nation-states assumed that Somalia was
unique in the continent as the nation and the state nearly overlapped.
The population shared many social and cultural traits, such as lan-
guage, modes of economic production, and religion. Given its social
and cultural base, the state was thought to be viable. Just over a decade
ago, it would have been impossible to imagine the disintegration of the
Somali state. Today, many political commentators are similarly stri-
dent about the clan structure being essential to the very essence of a
Somali community. They argue that it is not possible to reconstruct
Somalia without the clan being the basis of the new polity.
These essentialist arguments are grounded in a limited understand-
ing of Somali political history. They also lack an appreciation of the art
of state formation. The “shared social and cultural heritage” thesis fails
to recognize that common traits can form a necessary, but insufficient
foundation for building state institutions that cater to the community’s
collective interest. The ability of cultural resources to bind a society
together depends on how they are used. The socially unifying appeal
of these resources declines when mined continuously without the soci-
ety reinvesting in them. The callous exploitation of shared cultural
resources not only impoverishes their richness and resiliency, but may
also turn them into a national liability. This is exactly what has tran-
spired in Somalia. However, if a society does not take the long-term
vitality of cultural resources for granted, but continuously and con-
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sciously replenishes their richness and value, they will continue to be a
source of social cohesion. This means that a society must actively nour-
ish inherited shared values and develop new ones that reinforce the
appeal of this common heritage.
The most important addition to Somalia’s pool of shared resources
since the middle of last century has been the (colonial) state and its
institutions. The imposition of the state, in its colonial and post-colo-
nial forms, induced social processes that had the potential to reinforce
and positively transform shared values in an inclusive manner, or to
undermine and distort their appeal to the entire community.1 The
state’s impact on the vitality of shared values depends on whether the
authorities use public institutions to nurture a common or a sectarian
agenda. The diminishing attractiveness of traditional, shared Somali
values is not due to Somalis’ primordial predisposition for divisive-
ness. Instead, it is due to the misuse of public institutions and
resources for private gain. Moreover, the use of public power to intim-
idate and punish those who try to protect common causes has delegiti-
mated public authority and the worth of these public resources. The
authorities’ cynical manipulation of shared values and traditions to
mollify public distrust and prolong their tenure further alienated the
public from the state. Consequently, it has been extremely difficult to
mobilize people on the basis of shared sentiments.
Traditional analysts of Somali society have cited two occurrences as
evidence of the Somalis’ sectarian nature despite the fact that they
share a common language, culture, and religion.2 These are the Soma-
lis’ recent antipathy toward the state and nationalism, and the war-
lords’ success in carving up the country into fiefdoms. Advocates of
the clanist thesis wrongly insist that a clan-based federal dispensation
is the only political formula that will reunite Somalia. They assume
that genealogical differences led to Somalia’s disintegration.3 I argue
differently and propose that the causes of the Somali calamity are state
leaders’ failure to nurture shared cultural and social commonalities,
and sectarian entrepreneurs’ instrumentalist accentuation of social dif-
ferences. The latter has become a lethal weapon in the hands of sectari-
ans.
The state’s credibility has been destroyed because it failed to guard
the common interest. And the erosion of social solidarity based on
inclusive values makes Somali reconstruction an awesome task. Put-
nam’s thesis that building a stock of social capital requires many
decades seems to apply here.4 If Putnam is right, it will take a long
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(almost millenarian) time for generalized social trust to develop. How-
ever, Tendler suggests that public trust can be built in a relatively short
time.5 These authors’ seemingly contradictory positions are reconcil-
able. Communities and states can steadily generate trust and confi-
dence for a common cause. Shared values across communities are the
basis of civic bonds and trust in a society. But the state must take lead-
ership in nurturing society-wide civic bonds. Communities, in turn,
must scrupulously monitor state actions to ensure that public institu-
tions function in ways that consistently enhance the quality of those
shared values. Such partnership between state and community will
facilitate social capital generation in a relatively short time.6
The following discussion about Amoud University shows that
building people’s confidence that they can work together for the com-
mon good and establishing their trust in public institutions are not
necessarily long-term propositions. I argue that there is one critical fac-
tor to reversing the trends of the last three decades in Somalia. That
key is to create institutions that constrain sectarian entrepreneurs
while strengthening shared values and hopes. The community-owned
Amoud University may signal a new type of public effort in Somalia,
one that will enhance accountability, rebuild public trust, and advance
a common agenda.
The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. The first section
panoramically sketches Somali elite politics and describes how they
destroyed public trust in state institutions and undermined the impor-
tance of shared norms. Part two narrates how some Borama commu-
nity members are trying to resuscitate common cause through the
establishment of Amoud University. The final section assesses Amoud
University’s significance to the remaking of public confidence in
Borama and Somalia, and the re-forming of an inclusive national iden-
tity.
II. Elite Politics and the Destruction of Public Trust
A key development problem in Africa is the discrepancy between a
state’s claims and the impact of its actions on communities. Most
Africans assume that state managers care little about the common
good and are in business for themselves and their clients. Somalis are
extreme among Africans in this antipathy. Hostile feelings toward
state authorities rarely existed forty years ago when most countries
became independent, hoping to replace colonial bosses with regimes
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that respected Africans’ dignity and managed public affairs justly. This
section briefly sketches how the mismanagement of public institutions
in Somalia turned hope into despair.
Public despondency in the continent is deep. In fact, today citizens
are shocked when they receive courteous and efficient service from a
public servant. This sharply contrasts with popular opinion from forty
years ago when people embraced the nationalist project.7 Somalis
shared this optimism in 1960 and their nationalism generated incredi-
ble fervor and social unity that reflected their hope for democracy and
development. However, the sanguine public did not realize that their
hopes depended on the quality of the national elite and intra-elite poli-
tics. Somali elite politics manifested two contradictory political and
economic tendencies. One emphasized a Somali-wide identity, nation-
alism, the protection of the common good, and justice in the dispensa-
tion of the rule of law (the civic movement). The other predisposition
embraced sectarianism and clanism, driven by individualistic interest
without regard for community well-being (the sectarian movement).8
The Somali-wide versus the sectarian trajectories were contradic-
tory post-colonial national strategies embedded in the new republic’s
fabric, and marked the state’s institutional history since 1960. Four
elite qualities shaped the civic or sectarian impact on public institu-
tions and public trust: the degree of elite unity or lack thereof; the legit-
imacy of its leadership within the group and in the eyes of the public;
the leadership’s understanding of the nature of the collective project;
and the clarity of its strategy in translating plans into concrete reality.
The independence euphoria and the unification of former British
and Italian Somalilands in 1960 generated national sentiments that
masked differences between groups with competing agendas (1960 –
64).9 The patriotic fervor induced by the 1964 war with Ethiopia pro-
longed this spirit’s life span. But the appearance of nationalist solidar-
ity was short-lived.10 While the regime first enjoyed a high degree of
legitimacy with the public, the leadership showed little understanding
of the particulars of the nationalist project. Moreover, they did not
articulate a clear road map for achieving any development agenda.
Consequently, the regime undertook minimal institutional reform
other than streamlining the British and Italian colonial administrations
into a single apparatus.11
The second republic (1964 – 7) is singularly unique in post-colonial
Somali history on two accounts. First, the 1964 national parliamentary
elections exposed the ascendancy and strength of the sectarian forces
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and the opportunistic tendencies of many elite members. The number
of political parties proliferated and grew into twenty-four as individ-
ual elite members tried to gain a parliament seat in order to loot the
public purse. Only four of these parties succeeded in winning parlia-
mentary seats. Second, after the elections, the nationalist forces made
their last systematic effort to contain the sectarian tide engulfing public
life. For instance, the nationalist forces attempted to insulate the civil
service from undisciplined politicians’ particularistic intervention.
Further, President Osman and Premier Hussein had an ambition to do
more than merely integrate the two former colonies. However, this
regime failed to enunciate its development project clearly. In spite of
this weakness, the Hussein government understood that to make pub-
lic institutions effective and root out corruption and the abuse of pub-
lic power, it needed to bureaucratize its institutions.
Two of the Premier’s initiatives signaled his institution-building
strategy. First, he appointed his ministers based on their professional
skills. As a result of this action, a significant number of key portfolios
went to northerners. Many southern MPs were not happy with the
ministerial line up and accused the Prime Minister of favoritism. One
of the northerners, Mohamoud Issa Jama, who was nominated as Min-
ister of Agriculture, voluntarily gave up his post so southerners could
be accommodated. The second and most important decision was to
reform the civil service and establish a professional and autonomous
Civil Service Commission. The Commission’s mandate, with technical
assistance from United Nations experts, was to professionalize the ser-
vice. The assignment started with reevaluating all major posts in the
civil service and the qualifications of their occupants. It was discovered
that many senior officials were incompetent and ill equipped to lead
their departments. As a result, the Commission recommended reliev-
ing these individuals of their responsibilities for two years and giving
them an opportunity to improve their capacity. The Prime Minister
heeded this advice and dismissed nearly 200 senior officials over the
next year.12 Except for two northerners, all those discharged were from
the republic’s southern region, a significant portion of the southern
elite’s leading elements.13
This attempt at institutional reform was short-lived as an adminis-
tration less concerned with curbing corruption and insulating the pub-
lic service came to power after the 1967 presidential election.14
President Osman appeared to have lost the election for three reasons.
First, he was competing with a popular former Prime Minister. Second,
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Premier Hussein’s anti-corruption drive and termination of a large
number of southern elite members from the civil service alienated a
powerful political constituency. Third, candidate Sharmarke and his
allies promised seductive recompense for parliamentarians who voted
for him. Sharmarke’s promises worked their magic, and he captured
the presidency with a slim margin.
President Sharmarke and his Premier, Egal, understood the volatil-
ity of the electoral process. Immediately, they started planning for the
1969 parliamentary election. The elite, and especially those in parlia-
ment, failed to be united by anything except their willingness to trade
off any public resource for private gain.15 The leaders of the govern-
ment, having fueled this tendency during the presidential election,
knew the only way to remain in power was to appeal to the material
interests of the MPs, tantalizing them with rewards and promises.
Given these priorities, the regime abandoned the civil service reform
initiated by its predecessor. Corruption and the politics of divide-and-
rule, rather than fostering an inclusive collective project, became the
name of the game.16
The 1969 parliamentary elections confirmed that the elite’s sectarian
faction had gained the upper hand. The struggle for individual politi-
cal survival divided and united this cohort. Soon, the political process
disintegrated as 62 political parties fielded candidates. Ambitious indi-
viduals who were not selected by the main parties formed their own.
These self-styled opposition parties won 50 of the 123 seats. However,
once the election was over, the opposition MPs abandoned their par-
ties and joined the ruling party. The shift of political “loyalty” was
induced by the clear recognition that MPs could access public largesse
only if they were associated with the government. Moreover, political
bosses in power enticed these MPs to join the ruling party. In the end,
the sole opposition member of parliament was former Prime Minister
Hussein.
The military took control of the government before the sectarian
stampede could run its course, and the public poured into the streets
to rejoice over the termination of corrupt politics. The new order
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy during the first years of its tenure.
The swift and effective management of the 1973–74 drought, the intro-
duction of Latin script for the Somali language, and the expansion of
education and other services increased the regime’s popularity. The
military, with Soviet prodding, adopted socialism as its development
strategy. However, the government showed no sign of comprehending
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what socialism meant in the Somali context and it blindly adopted
Soviet-tested but unproductive economic management methods.17
Consequently, it retained, at first, the rudderless public service policy
of the last civilian regime.
The Somali army’s defeat in the Ethiopian-Somali war (1977 – 78)
brought the regime’s honeymoon period to an end. The government
discarded citizens’ rights and any pretence of supporting an inclusive
national project as the public and significant elements of the military
challenged the regime’s right to govern. As paranoia engulfed the
leadership, it began a massive campaign to put loyal supporters in all
key government positions without regard to merit or due process. The
majority of these new and quickly promoted public employees did not
have the skills or experience to manage complex public affairs, further
damaging the effectiveness of state apparatuses. Having lost legiti-
macy, the regime used military power to punish entire regions and
communities deemed disloyal. A most sectarian and brutal use of the
military machine occurred in 1988 when Hargeisa and Burao, two of
the country’s largest cities, were destroyed. These cities were targeted
for special treatment after guerrillas from one of the opposition move-
ments, the Somali National Movement (SNM), impetuously entered
them. The local populations were devastated, and survivors fled to
refugee camps across the border in Ethiopia.
The nation bled for another three years before the regime was
finally ousted from its final stronghold in the capital. By then, unfortu-
nately, all national institutions were ruined. Moreover, the separate
opposition movements, that collectively destroyed the old regime,
were sectarian themselves and had no national reconstruction pro-
gram. They fought each other for control and in the process ruined
what little the old regime left behind. The prolonged civil war and the
terror instigated by warlords reversed integrative national processes.
Warlords and faction leaders caused the fragmentation of the country
into “clan” fiefdoms. Most reasonable Somalis agree that Siyaad
Barre’s regime was dreadful, but it was better than what followed.
They often note that “a bad government is better than none.” Every
government since independence made some contribution to shared
values, except for two: that of 1967 – 69 and those dominated by war-
lords since 1991.
The people’s antipathy toward public management is the antithesis
of how Somalis felt about the nationalist project in 1960. Any thought-
ful citizen who takes account of what unifying values have been added
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to the old stock of shared traditions since independence will find slim
pickings. The first reinforcement of shared traditions was the unifica-
tion of British and Italian Somalilands in 1960, spearheaded by north-
ern leaders. The second episode is President Osman’s dignified and
democratic departure from the presidency in 1967 after failing to be
reelected. President Osman’s compliance with the constitution sig-
naled that no one was above the law of the land. Somalis now recog-
nize him as an exemplary founding president whom they wish others
would emulate. A third tangible addition to Somali social capital was
Premier Hussein’s valiant effort to professionalize public service and
insulate it from sectarian political intervention. Premier Hussein’s
qualities underscore the character of public service for which most
Somalis so desperately yearn. The fourth and perhaps the most endur-
ing addition to Somali social capital was the development of the
orthography of the Somali language. This act is taken for granted to
the extent that even faction leaders desperate to create their little
“homelands” use it as their official medium.
Somalia’s social and political balance sheet since independence is
dominated by liabilities that have significantly diminished the nation’s
sense of a common destiny. The murderous and illegal uses of state
power and the sectarian exploitation of national resources figure
prominently in the population’s collective memory of the last three
decades. Moreover, the incompetent management of public affairs for
most of the recent history has eroded Somalis’ communal self-confi-
dence. Undoing these liabilities is what reconciliation and reconstruction is
all about. Common projects that are effectively and fairly managed are
essential to establishing collective self-worth and rebuilding inclusive
polity and identity. These seem to be Amoud University’s guiding
principles.
III. Amoud University: The Rebirth of a Public Spirit
Attempts to rebuild the Somali state have floundered and conven-
tional international strategies seem not to produce meaningful
results.18 Warlords’ and faction leaders’ machinations to create home-
land-like mini-states in the provinces, akin to apartheid in South
Africa, have also failed to gain the public’s respect and the interna-
tional community’s recognition. Two of the more “advanced” clan-
states have succeeded in restoring peace in most areas of their
provinces, but have yet to establish legitimate, functioning, inclusive
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institutions. Even some of the ardent supporters of these entities admit
that they are corrupt and beyond reform.19 In their present guise, then,
none of them can be a blueprint for national redemption. The alterna-
tive has been civic-minded local initiatives to repair community infra-
structure, such as schools, hospitals, water, and electricity. These local
initiatives have made important contributions to reducing hardship in
many communities across the country. However, these and other
efforts by non-governmental organizations, whether local or interna-
tional, have not been able to do more than restore local services.
Amoud University is the only known exception to this locally ori-
ented activity. This recently chartered, community-owned institution is
also instigating a new debate between localities about national con-
cerns. Before examining the dynamics this event generated, it is neces-
sary to consider the historical background of the Borama community
that made the university’s establishment possible.
A. Borama: A Brief History
Like other towns in British Somaliland, Borama, a village established
in 1921, had only Quranic schools. Religious men dominated Borama’s
social circle. However, many urbane people from Zeila (an old cos-
mopolitan coastal port) who moved to town had a moderating influ-
ence.20 A British colonial officer with a leg injury came to Borama in the
mid-1930s to determine whether the town’s population was more
receptive to secular education than others in the Protectorate.
Borama’s elders learned that people opposed to secular education in
Burao had injured the officer. Since religious men dominated Borama,
they, too, rejected the officer’s message and influenced Borama’s opin-
ion makers to organize a demonstration against the officer’s visit by
hoisting tall religious flags and singing religious hymns. Nonetheless,
the demonstrators never threatened the officer’s personal safety.
Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur established Borama’s first non-Quranic one-
room school (Madrasa) in 1932.21 He taught Arabic and arithmetic. Sim-
ilar schools existed in other regions of the country. Religious leaders
did not object to Madrasas since Christians did not run these schools
and the language of instruction was that of the Quran. Aw Abdi
Sheikh Nur, however, was not a typical religious man who taught in
Madrasas. He invented non-Arabic and non-Latin script for the Somali
language and trained some of his pupils in the use of this script. More-
over, some of the merchants in Borama and Zeila used the script to
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conduct their business correspondence. Borama’s religious opinion
makers did not object to Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur’s Somali script, despite
its not being Arabic. Although Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur’s history and that
of his script have not been thoroughly investigated, Borama’s religious
men may have tolerated his invention since he was a member of their
club and came from a prominent religious family.
The religious community’s acceptance of Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur’s
orthography as a non-threatening innovation may have softened
Borama’s political terrain for secular education in later years. Within a
decade, his Madrasa students were among the most educated and
respected young men of Borama. Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur’s school had
become an institution with an excellent reputation by the 1940s. About
this time, the unforgettable Mahmoud Ahmed Ali visited Borama. Ali,
a former head clerk in the colonial service in Berbera, had resigned
from his job to, single-handedly, campaign for secular education in the
Protectorate and to convince Somalis of the benefits of modern educa-
tion.22
Ali’s initial strategy was to introduce secular education in English to
Somali people through Madrasa teachers in various towns. He
assumed that by collaborating with religious Madrasa teachers he
would blunt the opposition of the more traditional leaders. His first
encounters were in Madrasas of Sheikh Jama in Berbera and Sheikh Ali
Ibrahim in Hargeisa. The two teachers turned down his offer, for they
did not intend to become involved in non-Islamic education. Ali tried
but failed to win over the two teachers to the proposition that modern
education meant neither abandoning Islamic learning nor proselytiz-
ing for Christianity.
Ali’s final stop was in Aw Abdi Sheikh Nur’s Madrasa in Borama.
He explained his secular education program for Somalis and his disap-
pointing encounters in Berbera and Hargeisa. Aw Abdi told Ali that he
would call a meeting of town elders so that Ali could directly present
the issue to them. When Ali explained his ambition at the elders’ gath-
ering, they endorsed his mission.23 “Qabuul,” which means accepted in
Somali, was the word the elders used to signal their approval. Ali was
moved by the elders’ simple response and that approval marked a
watershed in northern Somali educational history. Borama’s elders
decided to try something, namely secular education, that the leading
lights of the northern Somali community had rejected. This was the
second time Borama took the initiative in such matters. The first occa-
sion was Aw Abdi’s invention of a Somali script.
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At that meeting, Ali inquired about who paid Aw Abdi’s salary for
teaching in the Madrasa. The answer was no one. Aw Abdi depended
on his father. Ali then asked whether the community would be willing
to collect 360 rupees to pay for Aw Abdi’s services for the following
year. The elders successfully raised the money by noon the following
day. Ali took the money and deposited it at the main government
office in town and told Aw Abdi to collect monthly pay of thirty
rupees from that office.
Ali told his supporters in Borama that he would go to Hargeisa and
solicit the colonial government’s support for secular education. He
also promised that Borama would receive its fair share of whatever
resources he was able to obtain from the administration. A few months
later, he returned to Borama and reported to the elders that the colo-
nial government gave him 17 pounds sterling for education. Ali
invested most of the money in a classroom hut in Hargeisa. However,
he presented a set of textbooks, pencils, and chalk to the Borama
elders. The elders were disappointed as they thought that Ali should
have given Borama a larger share of the money.
In 1944, the colonial regime finally decided to initiate its educational
program for the Protectorate by building elementary schools in several
towns, including Borama. For the first two years, Borama children
were smuggled into school to register, as the religious leaders’ opposi-
tion to secular education was still fierce. However, that opposition dis-
sipated in the third year, as people realized that the children were not
being converted to Christianity. Consequently, the school could not
accommodate the large number of children who came to enroll.
The need for an intermediate school arose as the first group of chil-
dren approached the end of the elementary program (third grade).
Intense competition ensued between Hargeisa and Borama over the
intermediate school’s location. Ali, who was then a senior education
officer, was the chief advocate for the Hargeisa location. Claiming
Borama was a better location than Hargeisa, the Borama elders peti-
tioned the Education Department. R.C. Bell, a new education officer
for the Protectorate from Rhodesia, arrived in the middle of this tussle.
After some deliberations, Hargeisa was ruled out as a site for the
school due to a water shortage in the area. Arabsiyo (35 miles west of
Hargeisa) was discussed as an alternative site. Bell was so impressed
with the persistence of the Borama elders that he decided to travel
there with a deputy, Yusuf Haji Aden. Once in Borama, he asked the
town elders to take him to the school’s potential site. The elders took
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him to Amoud Valley. It had rained a few hours before Bell and his
guides arrived, and the intermittent river was still full. Amoud Valley
was then thickly forested, and the beauty of the vista and the sur-
rounding mountains absorbed Bell’s attention. Before leaving the val-
ley, he decided to build the first intermediate school in British
Somaliland there.
Four years later, the struggle began over the location of the Protec-
torate’s first Vocational Training Center (VTC), a training center for
primary school teachers and government clerks. The contest was
between the Protectorate’s eastern (areas east of Hargeisa) and western
regions.24 The governor and his team awarded the bid to Amoud. R.C.
Bell laid the foundation stone for the school in 1952. When VTC
accepted its first class of students, Borama needed a secondary school
to have a complete primary, vocational, and secondary school system.
Amoud Secondary School was established later. Sheikh village in the
east, between Berbera and Burao, was the only other town in the Pro-
tectorate that had a complete primary and secondary school system at
this time.25
Borama was at the forefront of educational development in north-
ern Somalia during the final years of colonial rule. Now, let us briefly
consider Borama’s role in Somali post-colonial politics up to 1991. Dur-
ing the civilian regimes, 1960 – 69, Borama had three members of par-
liament. Abdi Booni was Deputy Prime Minister in the first
government, while Aden Issaq was the Minister of Education and
Defense in the cabinets of Premiers Hussein and Egal. During the mili-
tary years, Colonel Musa Goud was Borama’s native son in the govern-
ing military council. He held various ministerial posts during the
military’s long term in office. Generally speaking, Borama district, and
later Awdal region, played a political role proportionate to the size of
the region’s population. Some dispute this and claim that Borama
played a greater role in public service in the Somali Republic due to its
more educated population. Whatever the relative merits of these argu-
ments, Borama avoided being caught in the conflict of “clan giants.”
Consequently, for the most part, Borama was spared the physical dev-
astation of the civil war that ruined Hargeisa, Burao, and later
Mogadishu.
In 1991, the sectarian, armed Somali National Movement claimed
sovereignty over northern Somalia after the collapse of the military
regime. Immediately thereafter, the SNM declared northern Somalia’s
pseudo-independence. This act broke the SNM’s promise, made dur-
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ing its years in the political wilderness, that Somali unity was sacro-
sanct. The north’s secession did not produce immediate peace nor
establish a functioning administration. The governing coalition’s
tenure ended in April 1993, before stability was restored.26 Elite SNM
and non-SNM factions could not agree on a leadership succession
method and many feared that a regional civil war might erupt in
Hargeisa. Borama elders took the lead to mediate between the two
groups by hosting a regional peace and political meeting in Borama
that lasted for more than three months. A new head of the self-styled
Somaliland Republic was elected without hostilities breaking out
immediately.27 Borama remained one of the most peaceful towns in
Somalia during this period, and the community’s elders were the prin-
cipal guardians of stability. Two of the most distinguished, Haji Dahir
Elmi and Haji Jama Muhumed, had supported education in Borama
for over five decades.
Borama residents began to rehabilitate local schools and the hospi-
tal, which had fallen into disuse. By 1997, nearly 8,000 students were in
schools in Borama and its vicinity. Such success alerted town elders to
the question of what was to become of the growing number of pupils
after completion of high school, without jobs or further educational
opportunities available to them. Some of these children had already
joined militias that terrorized people in the region. At this time, the
idea of a Samaroon-owned28 university began to circulate among some
of the educated people in Borama. Several pamphlets, entitled Awdal
University, were produced in the Middle East and distributed among
the Somali diaspora in late 1993 and early 1994.
B. Amoud University: Investing in Community Institutions
The idea of establishing a university originated with a small group of
Awdal natives living in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. Four of
these individuals, Abdisalan Ahmed Nur, Hassan Ali Haji, Suliman
Ahmed Walhad, and Idris Ibrahim Awaleh, came to Borama in the
summer of 1994 to share their idea with local groups. Given the com-
munity’s dire need to find resources to support the small community
police force and rehabilitate water and electrical services, most citizens
considered the proposal to establish a university impractical. The
advocates went back to Arabia, but conversations continued in the
community. A year later, they returned in another attempt to persuade
the community of the value of the venture. This time, the discussions
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held in Borama and in Hargeisa were encouraging. A small committee
was created to plan and organize a workshop in which the proposition
would be ventilated.29
Fifty individuals participated in the deliberations of the workshop,
held in Borama on August 6 – 7, 1996, including senior town elders,
intellectuals, and other concerned citizens. Participants debated three
key issues: the need for and feasibility of the university; proprietor-
ship; and location of the university.
The town elders, inspired by the workshop organizers’ commit-
ment, took the lead in affirming the need for a university. Haji Jama
Muhumed and Haji Dahir Elmi were key figures. Being pivotal in the
development of public schools in Borama since the first one was built,
the elders insisted that all major institutions of higher learning in other
parts of the world had humble beginnings and Borama’s should not be
different. Despite the audience’s skepticism, the elders’ enthusiasm
carried the day. By the first evening of the workshop, participants saw
the need for a university. Furthermore, they concluded, in line with the
modest beginning argument, that Borama natives at home and abroad
would have to mobilize the necessary resources to lay the institution’s
foundation.
The item in the workshop that caused the most spirited debate was
the university’s name and ownership. The workshop organizers and
others felt that the institution should belong to the Samaroon clan. This
sectarian attitude was (and is) typical in all regions of the country,
even at the time of this writing. Some vocal participants cautioned that
it would be difficult to raise money from the local population and the
diaspora if the university was not the sole preserve of the Awdal com-
munity. However, this feeling did not run as deep as one might have
expected, given the conditions in the country. Other workshop partici-
pants argued that the university should belong to the community but
must be open to all qualified Somali students, regardless of their
region of origin.30 The reasoning behind the inclusive pan-Somali the-
sis moved many. Consequently, they accepted Amoud as the univer-
sity’s name. After all, Amoud had been the home of the oldest public
schools in northern Somalia. Moreover, the old boarding secondary
school had had a national reputation for academic excellence, and its
student body had come from all regions of the country.
Once participants reached these agreements, they elected two bod-
ies: the University’s Board of Trustees and its Management Commit-
tee, now known as the Technical Support Committee. The members of
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the Board of Trustees were respected Borama elders. The Technical
Support Committee (hereafter, Committee) consisted mostly of intel-
lectuals and other professionals, some of whom had taught at the for-
mer Somali University in Mogadishu.
The Board and the Committee had two strategic short-term objec-
tives: (a) to challenge the community to materially and morally sup-
port the establishment of the university (self-reliance on local
resources), and (b) to rebuild community trust in public institutions
and, consequently, reduce the influence of sectarian ideas. Well-
attended public rallies and focused group meetings educated the pub-
lic about the project. The Committee set a first precedent in
self-reliance and each member contributed $150 to the university fund.
Next, the Committee invited forty business leaders to a meeting with
the Board and the Committee. All invitees appeared for the meeting,
and Committee members broached the university idea and their plans
for self-reliance. Once initial introductions had taken place, a leading
businessman thanked the group for its efforts and invited his col-
leagues to take the lead in the venture. The business people agreed to
donate $8,000 to the fund.
As the community’s support surged, the Board and the Committee
traveled to Hargeisa. They jointly petitioned the authorities to transfer
ownership of the dilapidated former Amoud Secondary School prop-
erty to the university. The authorities granted the community its wish.
The Board and Committee then focused their attention on repairing
the eight-kilometer gravel road that links Borama and Amoud. Many
members of the community contributed labor and machinery to fix the
road. The total cost of the repairs was over $8,500, of which the univer-
sity paid $350.
Earlier, looters had completely vandalized the former intermediate
school buildings, stealing all removable parts, such as roofing material,
doors, and window frames. This was the fate of many public and pri-
vate properties in all parts of the country during the civil war. As peo-
ple fled the war, bandits stole whatever they could, often destroying
valuables they could not take with them. Such acts of banditry came to
be known as bililiqo.31 The school buildings were completely ruined,
except for the principal’s house, which was saved by a family occupy-
ing it. In contrast, the old secondary school, less than one kilometer
away, sustained minimal damage. Once Borama elders and the fami-
lies who lived around the school realized what had happened to the
intermediate school, they protected the properties of the secondary
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school by taking residence in the buildings. Further, they hid away all
school materials, such as books32 and furniture. In one instance, a
known Borama resident stole a window frame from the school. When
the guardian families discovered the missing frame, they went to
town, confronted the thief, and demanded the return of the frame. The
thief refused. Fearing that the standoff would lead to violence that sec-
tarian entrepreneurs could exploit, the elders intervened and pur-
chased the frame back from the thief. Although the guardian families
and the elders were worried that, by buying the stolen frame, they
might be setting a precedent and encouraging other thieves to follow
suit, fortunately no more stealing occurred. The only other damage the
secondary school buildings sustained was from the elements because
nearly all glass windows were shattered early on during the civil war.
The families living on and around the campus had turned two of the
old classrooms into a school for their children, and university authori-
ties permitted the community to use the building until a primary
school could be built in the neighboring area. Moreover, families were
allowed to continue to live in the school’s residential compounds until
they found proper accommodation. The university employed as
groundskeepers those who had protected the property, and promised
that their children could attend the university, providing they were
academically qualified. Finally, the administration decided to slowly
reclaim all school land from trespassers. (Some of the latter will
become well-known and well-off Borama natives, within the next few
years.) The university’s considerate and nonconfrontational approach
to solving social problems has endeared the budding institution to the
community.
The date for Amoud University’s first entrance examination, to be
held in Borama, was announced. Sixty-nine students qualified to enroll
in preparatory courses. In September 1997, they began a yearlong
remedial course in basic sciences, English, and mathematics. Since uni-
versity facilities were still under repair, these courses were conducted
at the Sheikh Ali Jowhar Secondary School in the town. Borama citi-
zens in Arabia bought and shipped textbooks (six subjects) to the stu-
dents. After completing their pre-university courses, forty-seven of the
students received satisfactory grades that qualified them for entrance.
Currently, students pay a monthly tuition fee of $15 that covers a frac-
tion of the university’s operating costs.
The pace of activity increased as the opening date drew closer, and
classroom, library, and office repairs neared completion. Organized
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women’s groups played a significant role in these preparations; they
poured onto the campus in large numbers to prepare the buildings for
use. Two of the three classroom buildings, each consisting of four lec-
ture halls, the library (which was completely renovated and
expanded), and staff offices were in mint condition before the univer-
sity was formally inaugurated. A local manufacturer produced the
classroom tables and chairs at a generous discount, and the Committee
bought two buses to transport students since the campus was several
kilometers from town and boarding facilities had not been restored
yet. Somalis in the Middle East paid $18,000 to get the buses to Borama
in time for the school’s opening.33
The university needed two drivers for its buses, and the Committee
consciously used the hiring process as a trust building exercise. A com-
mittee of ten people was selected of which five members were desig-
nated watchdogs of the five examiners. The monitors’ duty was to
insure that applicants received fair treatment. Such transparency was
necessary because people did not have confidence that this competi-
tive hiring process could produce a just outcome. The university
advertised the posts in the local media; twenty-three applicants met
basic requirements. Each candidate was interviewed and tested on
traffic rules. Only eight candidates qualified to proceed to the next
stage of elimination. The committee then announced to the community
the date of the road test, and many people came to witness it. Three
candidates were selected as the best drivers. The university employed
two of them and placed the third on a waiting list. After the monitors
had concurred with the selection, the onlookers applauded and
declared the process fair and professional.
The university and the hiring committee earned much public trust
for the unbiased, professional way that they conducted this minor, but
foundational, event. The symbolic value of this association of the univer-
sity with professionalism and fair management of public affairs was
enormous. Now, the community calls on the university’s services
when public issues are at stake, or demands that others emulate the
university’s practice when carrying out responsibilities.34
The Board and the Committee set the inaugural date for November
4, 1998, and invited 300 guests from the region to the opening cere-
mony. Senior authorities from Hargeisa came to give their blessings to
the university and donated $5,000. The occasion turned into a major
celebration, with nearly 4,000 people, rather than only the 300 invitees.
Most Borama businesses closed for the day. Many spectators com-
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pared the crowd’s joyous mood to the sentiment people expressed
during the commemoration of independence in past decades. The uni-
versity leaders announced that November 4, 1998, marked the begin-
ning of a new and important chapter in Somali history. They told the
audience that all resources that helped establish the university (except
for book donations to the library from Book Aid International) came
from Borama citizens or other Somalis in the region and the diaspora.
They challenged leaders in the audience to heed their civic duty to har-
ness the enormous latent energy in communities to promote the public
good.
Students began their classes the day after the inaugural ceremony.
All registered for twelve credit hours. College English, Introductory
Psychology, and Biology were taught during this first term. Spring
semester course offerings included Algebra, English, Somali Litera-
ture, and Psychology. The university has two departments, education
and business administration. Education was selected as a foundational
discipline due to the country’s dire need for qualified schoolteachers.
However, the community and the administration intend to reverse an
old Somali educational tradition in which all university graduates
expect to obtain positions in government. By contrast, it is hoped that
those majoring in business administration will secure employment in
established private enterprises or create their own businesses. Other
disciplines envisaged for the future include public administration,
public health and medicine, veterinary medicine, and agriculture.
Twelve lecturers, including the university’s two administrators,
teach in the degree program. Three of them lectured at the former
Somali University, and the chief administrator of Amoud University,
Suliman A. Gulaid, was a former Dean of the College of Education at
the Somali National University in the early 1980s. Earlier, he had been
the principal of Amoud Secondary School from 1970 – 71, while his
deputy, Farah Shuun, taught English at Somalia’s College of Educa-
tion. Seven of the other instructors hold M.A. degrees. In addition, the
pre-university program has three teachers. Other staff members
include a registrar, librarian, eight groundskeepers, drivers, and
watchmen. Staff salaries range from $100 to $500 per month. Since the
university does not have a wealthy benefactor, its ability to pay staff
on time depends on contributions from the local population and the
diaspora.35 Thus, the institution operates on a shoestring budget.36
Nearly all faculty and staff members are from the Awdal region, but
three instructors in the degree and pre-university programs are not
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originally from Borama. Until last year, all Board of Trustees and Tech-
nical Support Committee members were from Borama. Awdal natives
also dominate the student population. Only three of the fifty first-year
students are from other regions. The distribution of students in the
1999 – 2000 class has become slightly more diverse in regional terms.
Ten of the sixty-two students are from as far away as Mogadishu. The
class of 2000 – 01 is expected to be more diverse. Gender balance
remains skewed. There are only fifteen female students at the univer-
sity.
According to university policy, any Somali student who passes the
entrance examination will be accepted. However, the problem is that
most students live in regions where the university cannot conduct the
entrance examination. As a result, Borama natives dominate the stu-
dent body. This year’s entrance examination was conducted in two
locations: Borama and Hargeisa. The addition of more examination
centers in other regions will help to further diversify the regional dis-
tribution of the students. In fact, many areas in the country have asked
for such centers. Somali communities in other zones are putting grow-
ing pressure on the university to expand and rehabilitate boarding
facilities speedily so that students from outside Borama can be accom-
modated.
University administrators are particularly sensitive to the gender
gap in its student population. Local women activists have been urging
authorities to quickly develop a strategy to narrow this gap. Both
groups agree that a major factor in girls’ low enrollment in high
schools, and consequently the university, is the heavy responsibilities
girls bear in families. Such a burden in the family has become more
exacting since Somalia’s disintegration. For instance, the ever-increas-
ing rate of male unemployment, now estimated to be about 70 percent,
and excessive male consumption of kat,37 have forced women to
become their family’s main income earners. Income-generating activi-
ties take mothers out of the home, compelling daughters to take over
their mother’s responsibilities. In some cases, this means daughters do
not attend school. In other situations, they are permitted to go to
school, but they are still expected to manage many daily family chores.
As a result, they have little study time.38 These conditions have
reduced girls’ enrollment in schools and negatively affected their class-
room performance. A few women activists and a fledgling institution
cannot immediately rectify these serious social problems. However,
university administrators have taken some initial steps by creating
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tutoring and other special programs to help prepare girls for the
entrance examination.39
Amoud University faces many challenges that may altogether
undermine its existence. Two of the most formidable risks are the fol-
lowing: first, the university’s shallow financial base and the possibility
that sectarian entrepreneurs in other regions may try to duplicate the
university and, therefore, undercut its national and civic scope, and
second, divisive local elements may subvert its inclusive identity.
Despite these dangers, Amoud has already made its mark on the
national map. The question is how significant the mark is locally and
nationally in terms of rebuilding shared values and public institutions
that cater to the Somali community’s common interest?
IV. Amoud and the Recovery of Somali Identity
The collapse of the military dictatorship gave many Somalis false hope
that a second liberation would come. Instead, they suffered the worst
calamity in their history: political and social disintegration. Compara-
tively homogenous Somalia, which seemed free from ethnic cleavages,
disintegrated more easily and speedily than other multiethnic coun-
tries on the continent. Sectarian entrepreneurs’ ruthless exploitation of
shared values and the unwillingness on the part of Somalis to protect
public institutions made this fate inescapable. The failure of the inter-
national community and organizations that used clan divisions as the
basic building block for reconstruction to help restore national institu-
tions confirms that genealogical divisions within Somali society are not
the cause of Somalia’s disintegration. This last section of the essay
encapsulates the symbolic significance of Amoud University in rehabili-
tating trust in public institutions and remaking social relations and
national identity. The results of two surveys illustrate the social mean-
ing the Awdal community attaches to the University. Furthermore, the
results show how Amoud University students are rediscovering their
national identity in a context of sectarian politics.
Borama differs from other major urban areas in Somalia on three
accounts. First, nearly all public schools were reestablished within five
years of the country’s fragmentation. Second, in 1993, Borama hosted
the most successful peace conference in the country since 1991. Finally,
Borama established the only institution of higher education in the
country. A handful of seasoned community elders and intellectuals
were responsible for these unique accomplishments. Borama citizens
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are keenly aware of these achievements and approve of the elders’
guidance. In contrast, the people have nothing but disdain for the local
and regional governments. Two students and I interviewed sixty
Borama residents. To determine knowledge about Amoud University,
their sense of identity (clanist or nationalist), and their attitude toward
the university and Borama local government, we randomly selected
interviewees who worked or lived in the center of town. Residents’
responses to these five questions are summarized below.
(1) Do you know about the university?
Yes No
59 1
(2) Who owns the university?
Samaroon Somaliland administration Somalis Do not know
12 30 9 9
(3) Who funds the university?
Samaroon Somaliland Diaspora Development agencies Do not know
27 6 15 6 6
(4) Who can attend the university?
Samaroon only Somaliland only Any qualified Somali Islamic world Do not know
6 18 24 3 9
(5) If you had to choose giving a loan to the Borama local government
or to Amoud University which would you choose and why?
University Local government Do not know
48 0 12
Three key points are clear from this survey. First, according to ques-
tion two, 50 percent of those interviewed think the university belongs
to the regional administration. Another 15 percent assume it to be a
Somali university. Only 20 percent consider the university to be clan
property. In other words, nearly 65 percent of the sample believe that
Amoud University belongs to Somalis, not the Samaroon clan.
Second, over 50 percent of respondents to question three indicated
that Awdal natives in Borama and in the diaspora fund the university.
This contradicts the interviewees’ answer to question two that the
Samaroon clan does not own the university. Why would Awdal citi-
zens fund a university belonging to Somalis in a society where clan
identity is presumed to be supreme? The respondents told us that clan
identity is necessary in the context of lawlessness, but that clan cannot
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replace nationality and the nation-state. Furthermore, they indicated
that since the community initiated the idea of the university, the popu-
lation is responsible for taking the lead for the time being, but, in the
end, the university is a Somali institution.
Third, most respondents to question four recognized that the major-
ity of current university students are from the Awdal region. But this
situation is both natural and temporary. Because the natives of the
region founded the institution, it is normal, at the early stages, that
proximate settlements will have an advantage. However, as Amoud
takes root and expands, the composition of its students will change.
Ten percent of those interviewed believe that only Awdal natives can
attend the university. In contrast, 75 percent indicated that the univer-
sity should be open to students from the entire country and to other
Muslims.
Survey respondents’ answers to questions two, three, and four sug-
gest that despite Awdal region’s significant contributions to funding
the university, all Somalis should have access to its educational oppor-
tunities. This nonsectarian attitude of the majority of those interviewed
is surprising in the face of the common interpretation that clanist iden-
tity is the supreme driver of the country’s fragmentation. Given the
retreat of civic-minded people from the public arena and the domi-
nance of sectarian political entrepreneurs in the country, Borama citi-
zens’ nationalist attitude flies in the face of the supposedly
deterministic force of clan identity.
Answers to question five further establish the shallowness of clan
identity. Ninety-eight percent of the respondents felt that they would
prefer to loan their resources to the university rather than to Borama’s
local government. Interviewees also commented that the local govern-
ment had yet to use taxpayer money in accountable and productive
ways.40 They contrasted this corrupt behavior with the transparent
way the university is managed. About half of our informants noted
that they would still lend money to Amoud University, even knowing
that they may not get their money back. They considered contributions
and loans to the university (but not to the local government) as a wor-
thy investment. When asked why they were willing to invest in the
university when a majority of its students will be non-Borama natives,
they replied that education and clanism do not mix. They underscored
their hope that these investments will help create a better Somalia.
Nearly everyone interviewed was proud of Borama’s civic leader-
ship in national reconciliation and reconstruction. Most of the popula-
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tion feels good about the civic role its elders played in the 1993 Borama
peace and political conference, the mediation of conflicts in the eastern
part of the northern region, and the pioneering role of Amoud Univer-
sity in jump-starting higher education in the country. This in no way
means that clanist chauvinism is absent from Borama, but it does sug-
gest that most people prefer to be part of the larger Somali community
and yearn for public institutions that are democratically and profes-
sionally managed.
The second survey questioned first- and second-year university stu-
dents about their identity. The students echo the population’s senti-
ments. I wanted to know what the students thought of their identity
given Somalia’s fragmentation into warlord or clan fiefdoms. Like the
Borama population, their response was counterintuitive. Nearly 74
percent of the first year’s cohort and 76 percent of the second year’s
class identified Somalia as their country of citizenship. Eleven percent
of the second-year students and 19 percent of the first-year students
claimed to be “Somalilanders,” 5 percent of the second-year students
identified themselves as Samaroon, and the remaining 8 percent chose
not to answer the question. Seven percent of the first-year students
saw themselves as Africans and none claimed clan identity. Most of
those who claimed Somali citizenship were emphatic about who they
were. The three most assertive answers were: “I am a citizen of Soma-
lia but not Somaliland;”41 “I want to be Somali, as I was before, because
nobody can change my [nationality];” “Obviously, I am a Somali boy
who live[s] in Somalia and never had the will to go elsewhere. [I am]
not those who denied their nationality and claimed [to be] Americans
or Europeans. I am a Somali patriotic boy.”
Already, Amoud University has had several far-reaching influences
on its students and on the local population. In addition, the inaugural
celebration and commencement of classes held additional meaning for
some guests from war-torn or conflict-paralyzed communities in other
regions. The first and most obvious lesson Amoud has driven home is
the necessity of peace and stability for any development. A Hargeisa
elder, Abdi Warabeh, summed this up. He told his old friend, Haji
Jama Muhumed, “You are establishing a university for your young
people while mine are roaming armed bandits.” The restoration of
peace and stability in Borama does not mean that the community is
conflict-free and has reached consensus on all major issues. Rather, it
signals that no issue is sufficiently important in and of itself to polarize
people and give sectarian entrepreneurs the opportunity to profit from
Abdi Ismail Samatar
129
discord. Focusing on common ground may, in fact, lay the ground-
work for peaceful resolution of contumacious differences in the future.
Second, the opening ceremony also held another significance for some
Borama natives and others who came from afar. Many of these indi-
viduals had been enthusiastic contributors and had supported the idea
of the university, but they were skeptical the organizers could refrain
from using public donations for their private gain. With such suspicion
in their minds, they inspected the university’s rehabilitated infrastruc-
ture with particular care. The organizers’ appropriate use of public
contributions to jump-start the university restored a measure of the
skeptics’ faith in the feasibility of collective projects.
Third, from the opening day, Amoud University underscored the
preciousness of investing in collective projects that strengthen com-
mon values and deepen peace. Without such effort, peace will remain
fragile, and the community will be incapable of leaving anything
behind other than a legacy of civil strife. Fourth, nurturing collective
projects advances common cause and inclusive politics, and marks the
transition from peacemaking to development. Fifth, the university’s
foremost impact is that it has given the population confidence that
local resources can be effectively mobilized to address development
needs. The demonstrated effective use of resources and the establish-
ment of professional and transparent management systems convinced
Borama citizens that public institutions need not be corrupt and ineffi-
cient. In fact, the public often contrasts the university with the corrupt
local government — a difference associated with the latter’s appoint-
ment by a distant regional government and hence not accountable to
the population. This is not the case with the university, which is finan-
cially dependent on the local people and the diaspora.
Sixth, Borama citizens have witnessed the birth of a new type of
public institution that is answerable to the community. If Somalis are
by nature clanist as some analysts claim, Amoud University, which
was created after the national government’s disintegration, should
have hardened clanist feelings. Instead, Amoud has had the opposite
effect. By contrast, Borama’s fraudulent local government has been fer-
tile ground for divisive politics. Perhaps, a most crucial lesson of
Amoud University, then, is that well-managed community or public
institutions are the best defense against exploitation by sectarian entre-
preneurs. This conclusion supports the initial thesis that shared cul-
tural norms are a necessary but insufficient condition to insure
cohesion and national integration. Accountable institutions, which
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strategically build on shared traditions, foster tomorrow’s common
values and identity. The implication of this finding is that Amoud Uni-
versity and similarly run community enterprises can play a vital role
in reestablishing Somalia’s national government and inclusive, rather
than sectarian, politics.
Seventh, the Somali calamity and Amoud University’s establish-
ment speak directly to the ways in which social capital is destroyed or
formed. Instrumentalist uses of public institutions can easily demolish
shared values built over decades, perhaps centuries. This means that
communities and states cannot take trust and common traditions for
granted. Somalia’s story alerts us that national authority and the peo-
ple should continuously reinvest in public institutions lest the nation’s
social capital be eroded or destroyed. Moreover, common heritage is
not sufficient to purposively unite people unless it is embodied in col-
lective projects that cater to the entire community. Institutionalized,
they become the best defense against sectarian fragmentation and dis-
order. Finally, state collapse, as in Somalia, need not lead to despair as
individual communities can draw on their social capital to deal with
collective needs. However, single community-bound attempts may not
be enough to re-ignite national conciliation and development. Building
national institutions that supercede particularistic projects and
embody common cause is the next indispensable step.42 This is, pre-
cisely, the essence of Amoud University. 
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